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OUTCOMES OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS
WITH EXTERNALITIES PREDICTED
Jacob Dijkstra, Marcel A.L.M. Van Assen and Frans N. Stokman
ABSTRACT
In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likeli-
hood of ﬁnding compromises, depending on whether such deals have external-
ities. Positive externalities mean third actors proﬁt from bilateral deals,
whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We
develop the ﬁrst model of collective decision making that takes externalities
into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be
decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it
searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can
further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreas-
ing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of
any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single
outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union.
KEY WORDS . collective decision making . European Union . externalities
of exchange . Nash bargaining solution
Introduction
In collective decision making situations a group of actors have to accommodate
their different positions on the issues that have to be decided in order to reach a
final decision. Bilateral deals between (subgroups of) actors can increase or
decrease the likelihood of finding compromises that are acceptable to all actors
in the group, depending on whether such deals have positive or negative extern-
alities for actors not involved in the bilateral deal. In the case of positive extern-
alities, bilateral deals cause decision outcomes to become better for other actors
not involved in the deal, whereas in the case of negative externalities, decision
outcomes become worse for actors not involved in the deal. We develop a model
where exchange partners explicitly try to avoid negative externalities for other
actors to promote decision making by agreement. We test the model in the con-
text of the European Union where a strong norm for unanimity has been
observed repeatedly, even under qualified majority voting rules (Mattila and
Lane, 2001; Thomson et al., 2006).
Journal of Theoretical Politics 20(4): 415–441 Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications
DOI: 10.1177/0951629808093774 Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore
http://jtp.sagepub.com
 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://jtp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
We model collective decision making as decision making about controversial
issues with single peaked preference functions, as most well-known models do
(Black, 1958; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman,
1994; Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996, and many others). Deci-
sion making may well require simultaneous decisions on several issues. Differ-
ent issues should represent rather independent controversial elements of the
decision-making situation and as a set should cover the full range of possible
outcomes.
The dynamics in the decision-making process result from actors, with differ-
ent intensity and potential, trying to realize their preferred outcome on an issue
(their initial position), whereas per issue only one outcome that is binding for all
actors can be chosen. In a complex situation, possibly involving many actors,
actors will try to build a coalition as large as possible behind their initial posi-
tions or behind a position that is as close as possible to theirs. This informal bar-
gaining process can be seen to precede formal decision making and to affect the
final positions of the actors in the decision making, aiming at a collective out-
come that reflects their interests as much as possible.
The dynamics of bargaining processes in decision making are therefore
primarily based on processes to induce or force other actors to change their posi-
tions. Three fundamental processes can result in such shifts in positions: persua-
sion, logrolling, and enforcement.1 Through persuasion, actors aim at changing
each other’s initial positions as well as the salience of these positions (Stokman
et al., 2000). This is achieved through providing convincing information. Per-
suasion is particularly a dominant process in settings where common interests
are stronger than diversity of interests. In such settings, unanimous cooperative
solutions prevail even if formal institutions permit (qualified) majority decisions
or final decision making by one or more, but not all, individuals.
Logrolling and enforcement typically do not affect initial positions and sal-
iences. Logrolling can be seen as a process of negotiated exchanges between
two (subgroups of) actors. The result is that actors are willing to support another
position on an issue that is of relatively less importance to them in exchange for
support of other actors on the issue that is relatively more important to them.
Such bilateral deals between (subgroups of) actors create cooperative win–win
solutions for the exchanging partners, but not necessarily for all actors. In
a similar vein, actors can feel enforced to support another position under the
pressure of power. The two processes, logrolling and enforcement, are primarily
likely if actors’ initial positions fundamentally differ because of the different
weighing of ultimate goals. In such situations, arguments do not help to bring
initial positions closer to one another, so coalitions can be built only through
processes that affect the final or voting positions of actors.
1. In his sociological critique of economic models of politics, Udehn (1996) derives the same three
fundamental processes from the literature.
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In the social sciences, models have been developed to predict final outcomes
of decision making on the basis of the formal decision-making procedure, the
so-called procedural models, and for each of the aforementioned bargaining pro-
cesses. In the present article we compare the predictions of our newly developed
model with predictions of models in all these classes.
For persuasion processes that are oriented to encompass the full set of all
actors, the Nash Bargaining Solution is applicable if certain conditions are ful-
filled. Achen (2006) shows that the weighted mean of the positions of the actors
can be used as a first approximation of the Nash Bargaining Solution if the rever-
sal point of no-agreement is very unattractive and the actors are risk averse. Each
of the positions is then weighted by the product of the power and the salience of
the actor. That solution was earlier known as the Compromise Model (CM) (Van
den Bos, 1991; Stokman and Van den Bos, 1994). In the present article the CM is
the baseline model to which all other models’ performances are compared.
Procedural models are based on a careful analysis of the formal decision-
making procedures. Given the complexity of European Union decision-making
procedures, it is not surprising that scholars have different views on them. We
compare the predictions of our newly developed model with two different well-
known interpretations, namely the Procedural Model of Steunenberg and Selck
(2006) on the one hand and the Tsebelis Model (1996) on the other.
The best-known bargaining model assuming decision making is characterized
by a process of enforcement is the model of Bueno de Mesquita (Bueno de
Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1985). In this model
actors try to strengthen the coalition surrounding their position by compelling or
persuading other actors to change their positions. In the model, each actor decides
whether or not to challenge the position of each other actor on an issue. The out-
come of this decision is determined by the expected outcome of the challenge,
which is in turn evaluated according to its expected effect on the decision out-
come of the issue. In the present article the predictions of Bueno de Mesquita’s
model are compared with predictions of our newly developed exchange model
and with the outcomes of EU decision making.
A prominent model of logrolling processes or exchange was developed by
Coleman (1972, 1990). He devised an exchange model for social exchange that
has been adapted for and applied to collective decision making as well (Marsden
and Laumann, 1977; Laumann et al., 1987; Ko¨nig, 1997; Pappi and Henning,
1998). Coleman assumed that actors have interest in some events and control
over other events. By exchanging control over events, mutually beneficial out-
comes can be achieved. The solution is an analytic solution, based on the com-
petitive equilibrium approach assuming that actors are price-takers. The model
does not give insight into which actors exchange with which other actors at the
micro level. Moreover, the major mechanism in this model is that of a market of
private goods and the necessary adaptations to collective goods (binding out-
comes for all) are not straightforward (see Stokman and Van Oosten, 1994).
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In addition to the Coleman model, we investigated two other models of
exchange applied to EU decision making. One of them, the Procedural
Exchange model proposed by Ko¨nig and Proksch (2006), is an extension of the
Coleman model in which informal bargaining and procedural voting elements
are combined. The second model is the voting Position Exchange Model (PEM)
model of Stokman and Van Oosten (1994). This model assumes collective deci-
sion making is based on the micro process of bilateral exchanges of voting posi-
tions. As a consequence, positive and negative externalities of such exchanges
for other actors can be assessed (Van Assen et al., 2003).
In their standard textbook of microeconomics, Mas-Colell et al. (1995) define
an externality to be present whenever the well being of an actor is directly
affected by the actions of another actor. If an actor or a group of actors shifts its
position on one or more issues, it will affect the outcome of the decision(s). As
the outcome of a decision is binding for all actors, this implies that such a shift
has externalities for all other actors. If the outcome moves away from the posi-
tion of another actor, the externality is negative; if it moves towards the position
of another actor, the externality is positive. We may assume that bilateral
exchanges with negative externalities for others do not serve an overall consen-
sus of all actors. If such bilateral exchanges have only positive externalities for
other actors, the parochial interests of the exchanging partners coalesce with
those of the whole group and we can assume that such exchanges facilitate an
outcome that is acceptable for all. Within a setting where the formal or informal
decision rules are based on overall consensus, we therefore assume that actors
attempt to avoid bilateral exchanges with negative externalities.
The PEM enables one to investigate positive and negative externalities for
others, but does not include assumptions about possible effects of positive or
negative externalities for the exchange rates and/or choice of exchange partners.
Application of the model in the context of the European Union, for example,
showed that the negative externalities of model-predicted bilateral exchanges
were about twice the size of the positive externalities (Arregui et al., 2006). The
authors used this finding as their main argument why the PEM did not improve
on the predictions of the CM in this study, whereas it did in many other studies
(e.g. Achterkamp, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Rojer, 1996).
Given the fact that the European Union is a setting with a strong norm of deci-
sion making by consensus, we expect that actors adapt their exchange behavior
to avoid such negative externalities. That’s why we develop the Externalities
Exchange Model (EEM) in this article; the first formal exchange model that
takes externalities into account. The central idea of the EEM is to restrict the set
of possible outcomes of collective decision making by avoiding negative external-
ities. If actors avoid negative externalities this restriction might induce equili-
brium in decision making, which places the EEM in the context of the literature
on structure-induced equilibrium (e.g. Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). The EEM is
418 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 20(4)
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based upon the game theoretic Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS) of
Chae and Heidhues (2004), and takes the CM and the PEM, both of which do not
take externalities into account, as its starting points.
The EEM is a model of group exchange that incorporates externalities, in
contrast to the PEM. Since the EEM is strongly related to the PEM, a separate
section is devoted to the PEM later in the text. Apart from the models mentioned
above, we evaluate the performance of three other models of collective decision
making. These models were all applied by Thomson et al. (2006) in their study of
European Union decision making. The Domestic Constraints Model of Bailer and
Schneider (Thomson et al., 2006, Chapter 6) models the influence of domestic
politics in the member states on decision making at the European level. The
Coalition Model of Boekhoorn et al. (Thomson et al., 2006, Chapter 7) examines
the dynamics of coalition formation, both within the Council and between the
Commission, the EP and the Council. Finally, Widge´n and Pajala (Thomson
et al., 2006, Chapter 9) present their Issue Line Model, in which the multi-issue
decision situation is reduced to a single dimension, before being decided upon.
For details on these models we once more refer to Thomson et al. (2006).
The next section discusses the general structure of collective decision making
and the CM. Thereafter, the PEM and externalities in collective decision making
are discussed. In the subsequent section the EEM is introduced. In the section
after that, we briefly discuss the design of the study. The next section shows the
results of our analysis and the article is concluded with a discussion.
The Structure of Collective Decision Making and the CM
The models referred to in the introduction all assume the same structure of col-
lective decision making. It is assumed that there exists a finite set M of contro-
versial issues, which can each be represented by a one-dimensional interval
scale. These issues are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e. an actor can take
a position on one issue, irrespective of his position on another issue (mutual
exclusiveness), and the issues together cover the entire collective decision
problem (exhaustiveness).
It is assumed that each actor n, from the finite set of actors N, takes a posi-
tion, xnm, on the scale of each issue m, representing n’s most preferred outcome
of m. Furthermore, each actor n is assumed to have a salience, snm, for each
issue m, expressing the relative importance of issue m to the actor n. Finally,
each actor n has a capability, cn, reflecting n’s potential to affect the final out-
come of each of the issues in M. The actors’ positions, saliences and capabilities
are assumed to be common knowledge. Based on this common knowledge, all
actors are supposed to have a common expected outcome, Om, of each issue m.
In the CM, the PEM and the EEM, Om is assumed to be the weighted average of
DIJKSTRA ET AL.: OUTCOMES OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS 419
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The CM predicts that the outcome of issue m is equal to Om as defined in (1).
Both the PEM and the EEM use Equation (1) as the commonly expected out-
come of an issue, before a possible exchange.
The Position Exchange Model and Externalities
The basic idea of the PEM is that pairs of actors can mutually increase their
utilities compared with their utilities of the expected outcome in (1) by exchan-
ging their positions on pairs of issues. The PEM assumes that actors have single-
peaked preferences: an actor’s initial position on an issue represents his preferred
outcome, and any deviation of the final outcome from it, is evaluated as strictly






Equation (2) shows that an actor’s utility is assumed to be (i) additive over all
issues, and (ii) decreasing linearly in the absolute distance of the outcome from
the actor’s position, with the salience of the issue determining the rate of
decrease.2
In the PEM, two actors are assumed to be able to exchange on a pair of issues
only if they have positions on opposing sides of the expected outcomes on both
issues.3 With two issues, and their expected outcomes, we can partition the set
of actors into four groups, A, B, C, and D, as is shown in Figure 1. Members of
group A are on the left-hand side of the expected outcomes on the interval scales
of both issues, those of group D are on the right side of both issues. Members of
group B are on the left-hand side of the expected outcome on issue 1, and on the
right-hand side on issue 2, with members of C having opposite positions. From
this it immediately follows that members of A can only potentially exchange
with members of D, and members of B can only potentially exchange with
members of C.
2. Equation (2) does not imply that we impose the condition that each actor’s utility is negative.
Adding an arbitrary constant to (2) does not change the predictions of all the models.
3. If both actors are on the same side of the expected outcome, a shift of the position of the actor
closest to the expected outcome in the direction of the position of the actor farthest from the outcome
is profitable for both actors. Since it is profitable for both, exchange is not necessary.
420 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 20(4)
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Exchange between two actors is profitable only if the actors have different
relative saliences for the two relevant issues. Without loss of generality, assume
two actors, i and j, and two issues, 1 and 2. Assume i and j are on opposite sides
of the expected outcomes of issues 1 and 2. Denote the changes in the expected
outcomes on issues 1 and 2, caused by position shifts of actors i and j, as δ1 and
















Equations (3) and (4) show that exchange is only mutually profitable if the
exchange ratio ðδ2=δ1Þ is in between the relative saliences. See Appendix A for
a proof of why this is true. If (3) holds, i shifts his position on issue 1 in the
direction of j, whereas j shifts his position on issue 2 in the direction of i. Issue 1
is then called the supply issue of i and the demand issue of j, whereas issue 2 is
the demand issue of i and the supply issue of j. If (4) holds, issue 2 is the supply
















Figure 1. Exchange Between Actors i∈A and j∈D on Issues 1 and 2. O1 and O2 Indi-
cate the Expected Outcomes on Issues 1 and 2, Respectively, before the Exchange. A, B,
C, and D Indicate Groups of Actors.
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In the PEM all possible bilateral exchanges are determined for each pair of
issues from M. For each of these exchanges, position shifts are determined such
that the utility gains of the exchange partners are equal and at a maximum. The
exchanges are then listed in the order of the size of the utility gains. The exchange
with the highest utility gains is then executed, and all other possible exchanges
involving one or both of the partners of this first exchange, and in which these
partners use the same supply issues as in this first exchange, are deleted from the
list. This process is then repeated with the remaining exchanges on the list, until
the list is empty. Then, (1) is applied to all issues with the new actor positions,
and these are the outcome predictions of the PEM. See Stokman and Van Oosten
(1994) for details.
Between-group and within-group externalities
That externalities occur in collective decision making is immediately apparent
from (2) and the fact that position shifts affect the outcome of (1). Van Assen
et al. (2003) analyzed externalities in decision making, making a distinction
between within-group and between-group externalities.
Assume, without loss of generality, that actor i∈A exchanges with actor
j∈D, with issues 1 and 2 as supply issues for j and i, respectively, i.e. the situa-
tion as depicted in Figure 1. In the process of exchanging, both expected
outcomes are shifted towards the positions of the members of group B, and away
from the positions of the members of group C, who thus experience externalities
of the exchange between i and j. Most members of B receive a windfall profit on
both issues, and thus experience positive externalities,4 whereas the externalities
for members of C are negative. In line with Van Assen et al. (2003) we refer to
this kind of externalities as between-group externalities: actors i and j, who are
members of groups A and D, cause externalities for the members of the other
groups B and C.
Externalities also exist for same group members of an exchanging actor.
These externalities are referred to as within-group externalities. There are three
possible causes of negative within-group externalities. If none of these causes is
present, there are no or only positive within-group externalities. The three
causes are: (i) the outcome shifts are in the wrong direction, (ii) the outcome
shifts are in the right direction, but do not have a profitable exchange rate, and
(iii) the shifts are in the right direction, have a profitable exchange rate, but at
least one of the shifts is too large. Without loss of generality, consider actor
k ∈A, a fellow group member of actor i. Assume that the exchange between i
and j mentioned above takes place. Thus, O1 is shifted in the direction of xi1.
Since k∈A, O1 is also shifted in the direction of xk1.
4. A member of B can experience negative externalities if an issue shift on at least one of the
issues is too far.
422 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 20(4)
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Case (i) occurs whenever the relative saliences of groups are ‘intermixed’.










In this case, k disagrees with i on which issue to demand and which issue to sup-
ply in exchange with j. Case (ii) occurs whenever the relative saliences of two










In this case, k agrees with i on the direction of exchange (demanding issue 1 and
supplying issue 2), but feels that too large a shift on issue 2 has been conceded,
relative to the shift on issue 1 obtained. Now consider case (iii). Even when the
rate is profitable for all group members some actors in the group might still lose,
when the outcome on their demand issue is shifted past their most preferred out-
come.5 All actors of group A gain from the exchange if the sum of utilities
resulting from both outcome shifts is nonnegative, or, more formally,
si1½δ1I1δ+ ð2|O1− xi1|− δ1Þð1− I1δÞ− si2δ2≥ 0 8 i∈A: ð5Þ
In (5) I1δ is an indicator function equal to 1 if δ1 < |O1− xi1| on i’s demand issue 1,
and 0 otherwise. Hence no within-group externalities exist if (5) holds in the
exchanging groups.
To summarize, in the CM no exchanges take place. In the PEM bilateral
exchanges on pairs of issues occur, but cause between-group or within-group
externalities that are not taken into account in the PEM. In the EEM we develop
below, we account for externalities in two variants, depending on whether no
negative externalities are allowed whatsoever, or only negative within-group
externalities are prohibited.
The Externalities Exchange Model
The basic idea of the EEM is that all members of two groups of actors can
increase their utilities compared to their utilities of the expected outcome in (1) by
exchanging their positions on a pair of issues. Unlike the PEM, the EEM does not
explicitly model position shifts of individual actors, but directly models the shifts
5. All actors in one group gain whenever the exchange rate is profitable and δm≤ |xkm−Om|
holds for all actors k in that group. An actor k of that group certainly loses if δm > 2|xkm−Om|, since
he then loses on both his supply and demand issues. For each actor k there is a value of y∈ ð1, 2
such that k does not profit from the exchange but is indifferent between no exchange and this
exchange with a shift equal to y|xkm−Om|.
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in the expected outcomes of the pair of issues. Generally, a pair of expected out-
come shifts can be caused by an infinite number of different position shifts of the
individual actors. There are two variants of the EEM: the EEMb&w in which both
negative within-group externalities and negative between-group externalities are
prohibited, and the EEMw in which negative within-group externalities are pro-
hibited, but negative between-group externalities are allowed for.
We argue that the EEMw and EEMb&w might be applicable in different decision-
making situations. The EEMb&w might be applicable in situations where the grand
coalition of all actors in N is salient. In such a situation any negative externality,
whether between-group or within-group, can be considered inadmissible. The EEMw
might be applicable in situations where subsets of actors tend to cluster in the same
group (i.e. A, B, C, or D) across issue pairs. Here the group structure might be more
salient, and the focus might be on avoiding negative within-group externalities, but
not on avoiding negative between-group externalities.
The EEM assumes that two groups of actors exchange. Based on Figure 1,
two such group exchanges exist: either between groups A and D, or between
groups B and C. In the EEM, the predictions of the CM are taken as the initially
expected outcomes of the issues. Then, for all possible pairs of issues, alterna-
tive outcomes are sought that are Pareto efficient and nonnegative for all actors
involved. In the EEMb&w such an outcome means that no actor in N can increase
his utility without causing a utility loss to at least one other actor in N. In the
EEMw such an outcome means that no member of either of the two exchanging
groups can increase his utility without causing a loss to at least one other actor
from these two groups. Positive externalities are allowed in both variants. For
both EEM variants, the set PE of exchanges yielding Pareto efficient and non-
negative outcomes, is discussed below. Thereafter, we discuss the GNBS to
select one exchange of PE that yields the EEM prediction. Finally, we discuss a
procedure to deal with situations involving more than two issues.
The PE set under EEMw
To avoid negative within-group externalities, none of the three causes men-
tioned earlier must occur. Without loss of generality, assume again a group
exchange between A and D, such that the expected outcome of issue 1 is shifted
towards A and the expected outcome of issue 2 is shifted towards D, as depicted
in Figure 1. Causes (i) and (ii) of negative within-group externalities can then







, for all a∈A and d ∈D,
and (iii) is avoided if (5) holds.
Assume (i) to (iii) can be met simultaneously by a non-empty set  of out-
come shifts ðδ1, δ2Þ. Denote the maximum value of δm in  as δmax1m . A subset of
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 might not be feasible, i.e. some values of δ1 and δ2 might not be possible
because the actors in the groups are not powerful enough to affect this shift.
Define δmax2m as the maximum outcome shifts that can be affected by all actors in
D and A6, and δmaxm =minðδmax1m , δmax2m Þ. Then the set of feasible issue shifts 
and w can be defined as:
= fδ= ðδ1, δ2Þ : 0≤ δ1 ≤ δmax1 , 0≤ δ2 ≤ δmax2 g, ð6Þ







8a∈A ^ d ∈Dg, ð7Þ
where it is understood that shifts are in the appropriate direction. The set PE or
wPE is a subset of 
w and is described formally in Appendix B. If negative
within-group externalities cannot be avoided then wPE is defined to have only
one element, (0, 0).
The PE set under EEMb&w




PE is a subset of 
w
PE. From the
discussion of between-group externalities it follows immediately that negative
between-group externalities can be avoided if and only if one of the groups in
Figure 1 has no members while the outcomes of the issues are shifted in
the direction of the possibly remaining, non-exchanging group. In terms of
our example exchange between A and D, condition C=1 should be added to
(7) to find b&w. A second and final condition to be added is that all actors in B
should profit from the exchange, or
PM
m= 1 ðsim½δmIm, δ+ ð2|Om− xim|− δmÞ
ð1− Im, δÞÞ≥ 08i∈B. Im, δ is an indicator function equal to 1 if δm < |Om− xim|
and 0 otherwise. b&wPE is a subset of 
b&w and is formally described in Appen-
dix B. If negative externalities cannot be avoided then b&wPE is defined to have
only one element, (0, 0).
Selecting one element from PE
To single out an element from the PE set the EEM uses the Generalized
Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS) of Chae and Heidhues (2004). Chae and Heid-
hues generalized the solution of Nash (1950) to situations of group bargaining,








|, with e1 equal
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which has a number of desirable properties.7 The GNBS is the value of δ that






with utility gain Un, and group of actors N
*. In the case of the EEMw N
*=A∪D
or N*=B∪C, in the case of EEMb&w N*=N. The GNBS weighs the utility of
each actor by the reciprocal of the size of the group to which he belongs. Corre-
spondingly, the EEM takes as weights the capability of the actor relative to the
total capability of the group to which he belongs. Letting Gn denote the group of




with Gn=N in the case of the EEMb&w, and Gn equals the group to which i
belongs (A, B, C, or D) in the case of the EEMw. In the case of the EEMb&w, this
yields the GNBS without group structure.
If PE contains only (0, 0) then the EEM identifies this as the solution, which
is equal to that of the CM. If it contains more elements, a unique solution to the
maximization problem of (8) exists if the utility space is compact and convex.
That this is true is shown in Appendix C. Hence the EEM model always identifies
a unique solution.
Two comments are warranted on the GNBS. First, note that while negative
externalities within N* are avoided, the GNBS also takes into account positive
externalities through the product of the weighted utilities in (8). Second, (9)
shows that actors’ weights are computed within groups, implying that the
weights within each group sum to 1. This in turn implies that each group is
‘equally influential’ in determining the solution to (8), regardless of its number
of members or their relative capabilities compared to other groups. That is,
whether a group consists of one or many members, whether these members are
each individually powerful or weak, for profitable exchange to occur, the group
is needed anyhow. There is an analogy to a monopolistic market: the fact that
the supplier is only one actor facing a multitude of demanders doesn’t imply that
the supplier is weak. For profitable exchange to occur, he is simply needed.
However, note that in the EEM the summed capabilities of a group do determine
the group’s power to shift the expected outcomes of the issues.
7. The GNBS is (i) Pareto efficient, (ii) invariant with respect to affine transformations of utility,
(iii) independent of irrelevant alternatives and (iv) symmetric, and satisfies the ‘representation of a
homogeneous group’ property. See Nash (1950) and Chae and Heidhues (2004) for details.
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Procedure in case of more than two issues
In the case of more than two issues choices have to be made concerning which
group exchanges to execute. The following procedure is suggested and employed
in our application:
(i) Compute the CM prediction of (1) for all issues.
(ii) Compute the prediction of the EEM for all M(M− 1) exchange possibilities.
(iii) Actors vote for their most preferred exchange opportunity.
(iv) Select from the list of (remaining) issue pairs the one with the highest weighted
votes.
(v) Eliminate all issue pairs from the list containing one of the two issues on which
the exchange in (iv) took place.
(vi) If the list is not empty after (v), go back to step (iv).
On each of the M(M− 1)/2 issue pairs there are two exchange opportunities,
one between groups A and D, and one between groups B and C. If no exchange
is possible or PE is empty, the solution of the EEM is identical to the solution of
the CM, and U= 0.
We generalized the idea of voting for positions or outcomes to the voting
procedure in (iii) in which actors vote for exchanges instead of positions. It is
assumed that each actor votes for that exchange opportunity in the list that yields
him the largest positive utility change. Hence we assume myopic actors and
exclude strategic voting.8 An actor’s vote is weighted by the capability of the
actor, relative to the sum of capabilities of all actors in N. The exchange with
the highest sum of weighted votes is executed first. Actors vote only once, at the
beginning of the process. If there is a tie, one issue pair is selected at random. In
the data analyzed in this study, ties didn’t occur.
The voting procedure is identical for the EEMb&w and the EEMw. Thus,
whether both negative between-group and negative within-group externalities are
avoided, or only negative within-group externalities are avoided, all actors get to
vote for their most preferred exchange. This way, the EEM always accounts for
within-group externalities in the voting procedure.
Research Design
The current article uses the data collected by Thomson et al. (2006), which they
used for testing a large number of models that predicted decision outcomes of
EU decision making.
8. An example where strategic voting is profitable is this. Assume there are exchange opportunities
concerning issue pairs (1,2), (1,3), (3,4) that yield an actor a payoff of 10, 5, 1, respectively. Further
assume that either (1,3) or (3,4) will win the competition, and that the actor’s vote is decisive in this
competition. If he votes for (3,4), (3,4) will win, otherwise (1,3) will win. Then, if he votes for his
most preferred option (1,2) he gains 5, but if he votes for (3,4) he gains 1+ 10 = 11.
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The data concern 66 proposals of the European Commission, discussed by the
Council in the period January 1999 to December 2000, of which the final decision
outcomes are known. These proposals contain a total of 163 controversial issues.
The final decision outcome of one is missing from the data, leaving 162 issues
with known decision outcomes. The Council consists of the Ministers of the
member states, who deal with the relevant policy areas in their home country.
The actors in the decision-making arena are the 15 member states at the time of
data collection (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom), the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission. Decision
making within the EP and the Commission is not taken into account, as they were
conceived of as unitary actors in their dealings with the Council.
Data on the relevant issues within each Commission proposal and the posi-
tions, saliences and capabilities of the actors were collected by means of inter-
views with 125 experts. In the data, the position scales were standardized so that
the extremes are 0 and 100, defined by the most extreme positions favoured by
any of the actors. Position 0 mostly represented the position corresponding to the
largest change. Not all actors had a position on all issues: on average 15.61 of the
17 actors took positions on each of the 162 issues. Of the 162 issues in the data
set, 33 of these have only two possible positions, and are called dichotomous.
Actors’ capabilities were estimated using the Shapley Shubik Index (SSI:
Shapley and Shubik, 1954). To apply the SSI, all permuations of the actors in a
decision-making situation are considered. For each permutation, the actor that
turns a losing coalition into a winning coalition is called pivotal. The SSI of an
actor is then the number of times an actor is pivotal divided by the number of
permutations. Note that the SSI assumes that all logically possible coalitions are
equally likely. This assumption severely impedes the applicability of the SSI
when some actors refuse to form a coalition, for instance because of the exis-
tence of ideological differences (for an overview of the debate see, for instance,
Braham and Holler, 2005a, 2005b; Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996, 1999; and Napel
and Widgre´n, 2005). However, as Thomson et al. (2004) show, there are no
policy dimensions in the EU such that the member states can be consistently
ordered across all dimensions. Thus, in the EU there appear to be no underlying
ideological differences between the member states that would consistently pre-
vent certain coalitions from forming. Moreover, the SSI is used as the power
index in all the models from Thomson et al. (2006). To compare the results of
the EEM to these model predictions we were required to use the SSI.
All models were applied to each proposal separately. For instance, in the
EEM, only exchanges using two issues from the same proposal are analyzed.
Exchanges concerning issues from different proposals were assumed not to
occur since the proposals were dealt with by the EU at different points in time.
The EEM was also run on issues with an unknown final decision outcome since
they could, nevertheless, be used in negotiations.
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Results
The predictions of the EEM were compared with those of the CM, the PEM and
the other models from Thomson et al. (2006). First, we will present the descrip-
tive statistics of the EEM and the other models, followed by a comparison of the
EEM to the CM on all the issues involved. After that, we will present the results
of separate analyses on dichotomous and non-dichotomous issues, comparing
the EEM with the CM. Then, we will present the results of comparisons of the
EEM with the other models from Thomson et al. (2006).
Thomson et al. (2006) evaluate the accuracy of models in predicting out-
comes using the average distance between the predicted and actual outcomes.
The performance of the EEMw and the CM using that measure, is not signifi-
cantly different (Mean Absolute Error EEMw= 23.35, Mean Absolute Error
CM= 23.70, t=−0.50, df= 147, p= 0.62, two-tailed). Since we are interested
in what the EEM can predict both alone and in addition to what can be predicted
using the other models CM, PEM, etc., our main statistical tools are sequential
regression and logistic regression analysis. In each case, the observed outcome
of the issues is regressed on the model predictions. Note that sequential analysis
is especially suited to assess the fit of the EEM compared to that of the CM: the
EEM seeks for profitable exchanges without negative externalities ‘on top of’
the CM prediction. Correspondingly, in sequential analysis we test for additional
explained variance by the EEM, ‘in top of’ the variance explained by the CM
and other models.
Descriptives
The data contain 162 issues. The EEM analyzes Pareto efficient outcome shifts
with respect to the CM, on pairs of issues, within one proposal. There were 14
proposals in the data with just one issue, for which the EEM, CM, and PEM pro-
vide the same prediction. Our results only concern the 148 issues for which the
three models’ predictions might differ.
Of these 148 issues, the EEMw’s predictions differed from the CM’s on 65,
indicating that negative within-group externalities could frequently be avoided
when exchanging. Of these 65 issues, the EEMb&w differed from the CM on only
eight, indicating that both negative between-group and negative within-group
externalities could seldom be avoided. The upper-right triangle in Table 1 shows
the correlations of all the models’ predictions with each other and with the
observed outcome of the decision-making process.
Of the 148 issues, 32 were dichotomous and 116 were non-dichotomous. The
EEMw’s predictions differed from the CM’s on 11 of the dichotomous and 54 of
the non-dichotomous issues. Of these issues the EEMb&w’s predictions differed
on two of the dichotomous and six of the non-dichotomous issues. The lower-
left triangle of Table 1 shows the correlations for non-dichotomous issues only.
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The predictions of the EEM and the CM for the 32 dichotomous issues lie
in the interval [0, 100]. Observed outcomes, however, are either 0 or 100. To
evaluate the number of hits of each model in case of dichotomous issues, we set
model predictions in the interval [0, 50) equal to 0 and predictions in the interval
[50, 100] equal to 100. The proportions of correct predictions of the CM, the
EEMb&w and the EEMw were then 0.64, 0.66 and 0.72, respectively. These pro-
portions were all significantly larger than 0.5 (p= 0.082, p= 0.056, p= 0.011,
one-tailed binomial test, respectively). The proportions of all other models were
lower than 0.72, except for the PEM that had a proportion of 0.88.
Comparing the EEMb&w with the CM
The EEMb&w’s predictions differed from the CM’s on only eight issues. The cor-
relations between the models’ predictions and the outcome on these issues were
0.48 for the EEMb&w, 0.41 for the EEMw, 0.32 for the CM, and 0.11 for the
PEM, respectively. Thus, as expected, the EEMb&w predicted best on this sam-
ple of nine issues. Note that no powerful statistical test could be performed
because of the low number of cases.
Comparing the EEMw with the CM
The results of sequential regression and logistic regression analyses on all cases are
summarized in Table 2. In the first step of the sequential analyses the CM was
entered, in the second step the EEMw. The main result of these analyses was that add-
ing the EEMw prediction to the equation improved the prediction of the outcome.
If all cases were analyzed simultaneously, adding the EEM prediction
increased R2 by 0.043 ðF= 8:49, df1= 1, df2= 145, p= 0.002, one-tailed). This
corresponds to a small to intermediate effect size (Cohen, 1988). Keeping con-
stant the CM’s prediction, a unit increase in the EEMw’s prediction was associated
with an average increase in the outcome equal to 0.82. If only non-dichotomous
issues were analyzed, the explained variance increased by 0.016 ðF= 2:23,
df1= 1, df2= 113, p= 0.069, one-tailed), which corresponds to a small effect.
Here, the coefficient of the EEMw’s prediction was 0.42. Finally, if only dichoto-
mous issues were analyzed the EEMw also improved the prediction of the out-
come significantly (χ2= 8:42, df= 1, p= 0.002, one-tailed). Controlling for the
CM’s prediction, a unit increase in the EEMw’s prediction on average increased
the odds of outcome 100 by a factor 1.25.
It is also important to note that before adding the EEMw’s prediction the
CM’s prediction explained a significant part of the outcome, but that this was no
longer true after entering the EEMw’s prediction. That is, the EEMw could
explain what was explained by the CM, and explained part of the outcome that
could not be explained by the CM. A strange result was that the coefficient of
CM was negative in the case of dichotomous issues (Wald Z= 2.23, p= 0.932,
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one-tailed); controlling for the EEMw’s prediction, if CM predicted a larger
probability of outcome 100, then this outcome was less likely. We can only attri-
bute this strange result to sampling error.
The analyses were also performed only on those 65 issues for which the EEMw
and CM produced different predictions. Because of a lack of cases, the analysis
could not be performed on dichotomous issues only. Taking all 65 issues together,
adding the EEMw to the CM significantly increased R
2 by 0.102 (F= 9:18,
df1= 1, df2= 62, p= 0.002, one-tailed), corresponding to an intermediate to
large effect size. Adding the EEMw to the CM for non-dichotomous issues only
also significantly increased R2, by 0.031 (F= 2:17, df1= 1, df2= 51, p= 0.044,
one-tailed), corresponding to a small to intermediate effect size.
We also tested whether the predictive success of the EEMw and the CM dif-
fered across decision procedures (either consultation or co-decision, and either
qualified majority voting or unanimity), and policy areas (internal market, agri-
culture and other areas). Only an effect of policy area was found; both the EEMw
and CM performed worse on non-dichotomous issues in the area of the internal
market, compared with the other policy areas (R2-change= 0.076, p= 0.004 and,
R2-change= 0.061, p= 0.013, two-tailed, respectively).
Comparing the EEMw with the other models
There were only 14 dichotomous issues for which all the models discussed in
the introduction provided a prediction, which was too low a number to reliably
estimate a logistic regression model. Concerning the non-dichotomous issues,
there were 75. Table 3 shows the estimates of the OLS regression including all
models, on these 75 issues.
In Model II, adding the EEMw to the model with only the CM yielded a signifi-
cant increase in R2 of 0.13 (F= 13:21, df1= 1, df2= 72, p= 0.0005, one-tailed).
This increase corresponds to a large effect (Cohen, 1988). We note that the
improvement caused by the EEMw for these 75 issues was much larger than the
improvement for all 116 non-dichotomous issues. Adding the PEM in Model III
yielded an insignificant increase in R2 of 0.003 (F= 0:34, df1= 1, df2= 71,
p= 0.281, one-tailed). Adding all the other models in Model IV increased R2 with
0.107, which was not significant (F= 1:41, df1= 8, df2= 63, p= 0.105). In
Model IV, the parameters of the Procedural Exchange and the Tsebelis models
were significant (t= 2:64, p= 0.005, and t=−1:83, p= 0.036, one-tailed, respec-
tively), although the latter was negative. Models II, III and IV show that adding
other models yielded a negative parameter for the CM, which produces a weird
interpretation. The parameter of the EEMw was significantly positive in all models.
Analyzing all 148 issues, we also compared the EEMw to all models other
than the CM, by starting with the other model and then adding the EEMw.
For non-dichotomous issues, this always led to a significant increase in R2.
Hence, the EEMw could explain part of the outcome that could not be explained
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by each of the other models alone. For dichotomous issues, the EEMw did not
significantly reduce −2LL when added to the PEM (χ2= 0:086, df= 1,
p= 0.385, one-tailed). Finally, we reversed the order of analysis, i.e. we started
with the EEMw and then added another model. For non-dichotomous issues this
led to a marginally significant increase in R2 of 0.019 (F= 2:09, df1= 1,
df2= 79, p= 0.076, one-tailed) only when adding the Procedural Exchange
Model, which corresponds to a small effect. However, this one marginal signifi-
cant effect can be explained by chance alone, i.e. if the null hypothesis is true in
all eight tests.9 For dichotomous issues, −2LL was significantly decreased when
Table 3. OLS Regression Estimates for Non-dichotomous Issues;
Standard Errors in Parentheses; Observed Outcome as Dependent Variable;
Model I with CM only; Model II with CM and EEMw; Model III with CM,
EEMw and PEM; Model IV with all models; N= 75
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 26.00*** 28.50*** 28.40*** 34.14***
(8.99) (8.35) (8.39) (9.95)
CM 0.54*** −0.64** −0.61** −1.97***
(0.15) (0.35) (0.36) (0.75)




















R2-change 0.161*** 0.130*** 0.294*** 0.107
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01, one-tailed t-test for parameters. For R2 significance of changes
was tested with one-tailed F-tests.
9. The probability that the smallest p-value of seven tests is 0.076 or larger, if the null hypothesis
is true in all seven tests, is 0.469.
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adding the CM to the EEMw (χ
2= 4:46, p= 0.015, one-tailed). However, the
parameter for the CM was then negative (−0.17, with S.E.= 0.12), indicating
the predictive failure of the CM. The only other model that significantly
decreased −2LL when added to the EEMw, while simultaneously having a posi-
tive parameter value, was the PEM (χ2= 5:32, p= 0.01, one-tailed).
Conclusions and Discussion
In decision-making contexts with a strong norm of unanimity, such as the
European Union, externalities of exchanges between (subgroups of) actors play
an important role in the decision-making process. Negative externalities impede
the achievement of a general concensus, and will be frowned upon, whereas
positive externalities promote general consensus and will be applauded. Despite
the abundance of externalities in decision-making and despite the fact that field
and experimental data allude to their importance for the outcomes of the deci-
sion making process, prior to this article no formal model existed that accounts
for externalities. Thus, the Externalities Exchange Model (EEM) developed in
this article is the first formal model of collective decision making that takes
externalities of exchange into account.
Two variants of the EEM exist. The EEMb&w prohibits both negative within-
group and negative between-group externalities, whereas the EEMw prohibits
only negative within-group externalities. The EEM models are based on the
game theoretic GNBS of Chae and Heidhues (2004). If negative externalities
cannot be prevented, the EEM identifies the weighted average of all actors’ vot-
ing positions as the solutions for a pair of decision issues, which equals the solu-
tion of the CM. Otherwise, the EEM prediction equals the GNBS of the set of
permissible Pareto efficient group exchanges.
Although based on the principles of bilateral exchange, the EEM does not model
positions shifts of individual actors, but directly models shifts in the excpected out-
comes of the issues. It was proven that the EEM always identifies a unique solution.
A procedure was proposed to deal with decision situations consisting of more than
two issues. In this procedure all actors vote for the group exchange yielding their
largest utility gain. The group exchanges are then carried out in the order of the
sum of weighted votes, after deleting those issues that were already used in a pre-
vious exchange. The voting procedure thus assumes that actors’ weighted votes set
the ‘agenda’, determining the order in which the issues are dealt with. The most
powerful actors, i.e. the actors with the largest weights, have the largest influence
on this agenda setting. This appears to be a plausible assumption.
An additional assumption of the voting procedure is that actors are ‘myopic’ in
the sense that they do not vote strategically. That is, they do not account for the
way in which their individual votes add up with the votes of all other actors to pro-
duce the eventual order of the group exchanges. This implies that our voting
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procedure allows group exchanges taking place that would not have taken place,
had we assumed perfectly forward-looking rational actors. Such non-myopic actors
would consider all consequences of their and other players’ voting behavior on the
ordering of the exchanges, and subsequently choose their best replies. Since the
EEM is otherwise based on assumptions of rational actor behavior, an elaboration
of the EEM might therefore include strategic behavior in the voting phase, allow-
ing only orderings of the exchanges that constitute a Nash equilibrium.
The EEM models were applied to decision making on 162 issues in the EU.
Analyses were performed on 148 issues for which the predictions of the EEM,
the CM, and the PEM were not identical. In group exchanges involving 65 of
these issues, within-group externalities of exchange could be avoided. On only
eight issues out of these 65, negative externalities of exchange could be avoided.
On these eight issues the EEMb&w outperformed the EEMw, the CM, and the
PEM, as expected, although no statistically powerful test could be performed.
Our analyses focused on comparing the EEMw with the CM, a model that was
said to outperform many more sophisticated models (Thomson et al., 2006). Our
results were conclusive: the EEMw could explain all that was explained by the
CM, and additionally explained part of the outcome that could not be explained
by the CM. The effect size varied across analyses from almost intermediate to
large, and was largest when only the 75 non-dichotomous issues for which all
models yielded a prediction were analyzed. A possible explanation for this large
effect size is that on these 75 issues the outcome that would obtain when no agree-
ment would be reached was clearly identified, which was not the case for the
other issues. When this point of no agreement or reversal point is identified, it
becomes easier for actors to determine the value of outcome shifts, since the
reversal point provides the scale with a reference point. Consequently, exchange
processes are facilitated, since it is easier for actors to negotiate about the size of
the shifts. The success of the EEM compared to that of the CM is indirect evi-
dence that groups of actors indeed exchange in order to increase their utilities.
The EEMw also outperformed the PEM on non-dichotomous issues; it could
explain what was explained by the PEM, and explained part of the outcome that
could not be explained by the PEM. The success of the EEMw compared with that
of the PEM is indirect evidence supporting the hypothesis that actors, while exchan-
ging, account for negative externalities of exchange for other actors with whom they
agree on both non-dichotomous issues. Incorporating all other models as well, there
was only minor evidence that the Procedural Exchange model explained part of the
outcome that could not be explained by the EEMw or any of the other models.
The EEMw outperformed all other models on dichotomous issues, except the
PEM, which outperformed the EEMw. The PEM also outperforms the other
models on dichotomous issues in the current article and in Thomson et al.
(2006). It might be that, when dealing with dichotomous issues, exchange is
easier to envision for actors than when dealing with non-dichotomous issues.
With dichotomous issues, exchange simply means, ‘I vote for you on this issue, if
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you vote for me on the other.’ No ‘shifting in the direction of the other’ is
involved. Therefore, the model of exchange underlying the PEM and the EEM
might be closer to the actual decision-making process when dealing with dichoto-
mous issues, than when dealing with non-dichotomous ones. This raises interest-
ing research questions concerning the conditions under which exchange actually
occurs in decision making and when it is a valid model of it, yielding accurate
predictions. Questions like these are related to the broader issue of the scope con-
ditions of the models we tested in this article. Bueno de Mesquita’s model, for
instance, was originally conceived as a model predicting outcomes in one-shot
interactions, which is not characteristic of decision making in the EU context. In
contrast to the Bueno de Mesquita model, EEM is expected to generate more
accurate predictions in contexts where unanimity is formally or informally
required and unrestricted exchanges between subgroups generate negative extern-
alities. This is exactly the setting of the European Union. Different models may
have different scope conditions, and further research must be done to find out in
which decision-making contexts a model provides the best predictions.
Note that we have presented no data, and thus have performed no tests,
concerning the actual decision process. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether
the conception of decision making as ‘group exchanges without negative extern-
alities’, as assumed by the EEM, is ecologically valid. Nevertheless, the good
overall performance of the EEMw relative to the other models points to the
determining influence externalities have on the outcomes of decision making,
and the necessity of accounting for them in any model of decision making.
The fact that the solutions resulting from the EEM are Pareto efficient under the
relevant coalition structure, doesn’t imply that there exist no actors that could
improve on the solution for themselves. More specifically, as the PEM shows, pairs
of actors will generally have exchange opportunities that are profitable for both part-
ners, but cause negative externalities for others, possibly including their fellow
group members. Hence, abstaining from these exchanges is an indication of solidar-
ity, resembling making contributions to a collective good or cooperating in a
resource dilemma (see, for instance, Hardin, 1968). This raises questions concerning
the conditions under which such contributions occur. One would expect that in
decision-making contexts in which the composition of the groups from Figure 1 dif-
fers markedly across issue pairs, negative between-group externalities are unaccep-
table, rendering the EEMb&w the appropriate model. In more polarized contexts,
however, where the same groups of actors frequently agree on pairs of issues, nega-
tive between-group externalities might be acceptable, but negative within-group
externalities are prohibited. We explored this hypothesis for the data analyzed in
the current article. Within the 148 proposals containing two or more issues, there
were 179 issue pairs. For each pair of actors, we analyzed whether the observed
proportion of times they were in the same group, differed significantly from the pro-
portion expected, if actors were randomly distributed over the four groups on each
issue pair, given the marginal distributions observed in the data. We indeed found
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significant clustering in the data. By and large there were two groups of countries
distinguishable: countries mostly from northern Europe clustered together on pairs
of issues (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and the
UK), as did southern member states (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
Other actors were either isolated (the Commission and the EP) or hard to place in a
single cluster (Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg). According to our hypothesis,
this would indicate that negative between-group externalities were acceptable, pos-
sibly explaining the predictive success of the EEMw compared to the CM.
Investigating the conditions under which negative between-group or within-
group externalities are accepted, and the consequences this has for the predictive
power of the EEMb&w and the EEMw compared with other models, appears a fruit-
ful alley for future research. Especially the clustering found in the data, based on
actors’ positions on the issues, seems a promising lead. The EEM should be applied
to a variety of data sets together with an analysis of the clustering, to see whether
our hypothesis from the previous paragraph is corroborated. Another approach
would be to design experiments with induced positions, saliences and capabilities
to investigate the predictive power of the EEM and the effects of clustering.
Finally, interesting questions arise concerning how the structure of actor posi-
tions on issues and the clustering into groups resulting from this, interacts with
formal and informal decision rules, such as (the pressure for) unanimity, qualified
majority and simple majority, or the urge to compensate losing minorities on
future decisions.
Appendix
A. Conditions for mutually profitable bilateral exchange
Assume i and j are on opposite sides of the expected outcomes of issues 1
and 2. Using (2), their utilities are Ui=−si1|xi1−O1|− si2|xi2−O2| and
Uj=−sj1|xj1−O1|− sj2|xj2−O2|, respectively. If δ1 is in the direction of xi1,
then both actors’ utility changes are si1δ1− si2δ2 and −sj1δ1+ Sj2δ2. Since both
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B. Deriving wPE and 
b&w
PE
First some notation. Assume a group exchange between A and D, such that
the expected outcome of issue 1 is shifted towards A and the expected outcome




jm be the positions of the
members of group j farthest and closest from Om on j’s demand issue m, respec-
tively. Moreover, let a0 and d0 be the members of A and D that are closest in
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. Denote the utility change for
actor n, as Un : →<, and define a utility space S= fu∈<N* : u= ðU1ðδÞ,
U2ðδÞ, . . . , UNðδÞÞ, δ∈g, with N*=A∪D or N*=B∪C in the EEMw and
N*=N in the EEMb&w.
Three conditions need to be added to w to specify wPE. First, all members
of both A and D prefer a shift that results in an outcome somewhere between
xclosestjm and x
farthest
jm , over a shift beyond x
farthest
jm . Hence δ’s upper bound becomes
minf|xfarthestjm −Om|, δmaxm g. Second, at least one of the groups must shift at least
minf|xclosestjm −Om|, δmax2 g, because otherwise a further shift with the same
exchange ratio is a Pareto efficient improvement. Third, of course, Un≥ 0 for all
actors in A and D. Combining the three conditions yields:
wPE= fδ= ðδ1, δ2Þ : ðminf|xfarthestA1 −O1|, δmax1 g≥ δ1≥minf|xclosestA1 −O1|, δmax1 g,








minf|xfarthestD2 −O2|, δmax2 g≥ δ2≥minf|xclosestD2 −O1|, δmax2 g, Ui≥ 08i∈N*ÞÞ
Two additional conditions of b&wPE are that C= f1g and all actors’ utilities
should be nonnegative.
C. S is compact and convex
Utility space S is defined above on = fδ= ðδ1, δ2Þ : 0≤ δ1 ≤ δmax1 ,
0≤ δ2 ≤ δmax2 g. Note that  is compact and convex. Because  is compact, S is
compact as well. S is also convex because all Un are linear.
Proof. Assume we have δ, δ0 ∈, u= ðU1ðδÞ,U2ðδÞ, . . . ,UNðδÞÞ, and
v= ðU1ðδ0Þ,U2ðδ0Þ, . . . ,UNðδ0ÞÞ. Now consider λu+ ð1− λÞv, with λ∈ ½0, 1.
For each actor n, this yields λun+ ð1−λÞvn=Unðλδ+ ð1− λÞδ0Þ. Since  is
convex, λδ+ ð1−λÞδ0 ∈. Thus λu+ ð1− λÞ v= ðU1ðλδ+ ð1− λÞδ0Þ,
U2ðλδ+ ð1− λÞδ0Þ, . . . ,UNðλδ+ ð1− λÞδ0ÞÞ∈ S, and S is convex. Hence the
GNBS identifies only one solution from S. This solution must be in PE because
the GNBS satisfies Pareto efficiency.
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